中国为促进经济回升陆续出台了十大产业振兴政策，虽然具体实施细则尚未公布，但一些已透露的政策要点已经让人忧从中来。比如，汽车产业振兴规划明确提出，三年内占市场份额90%以上的企业集团由目前的14家减少到10家以内，这实际上还是当年将汽车产业整合为三大、三小六家企业集团的翻版。行业整合固然不错，但问题是整合度远比中国高的美、日、欧汽车产业现在都举步维艰，中国在全球经济危机的大背景下用这一思路来振兴汽车行业，无异于吃阿司匹林治非典──缓不济急。 从政府目前应对经济危机的思路看，似乎是准备以“中央军”为主力打一场“御敌于国门之外”的大会战。然而从当前全球经济危机的汹汹来势看，各国目前仍处在被动防御的阶段，一如上世纪30年代末面对强大日本侵略军的中国军队。八年抗战中，由中央军为主力的正面战场作战固然必不可少，但如果没有在敌后广泛开展的游击战、运动战，中国也难坚持到抗战胜利，而共产党正是凭借这些“人民战争”由弱变强、逐步壮大的。然而，它应对当前全球危机的努力却并未充分体现出其一贯标榜的“群众路线”，说具体点，就是中、小民营企业抗击经济危机的潜力仍未得到充分发挥，而这些政府眼中的“散兵游勇”正是中国企业的大多数。 诚然，温家宝总理在政府工作报告中承诺，要鼓励私人资本在基础设施建设、金融和公用事业领域投资，政府也已承诺会在信贷等方面对中、小民营企业予以支持，但现在重要的是把这些承诺落实到具体措施上，而目前至少从汽车产业振兴规划中看不到这一点。比如最近被风传有意收购沃尔沃的吉利汽车，这家中国最大的民营汽车企业也只是将将跨过国内十大轿车企业的门坎，如果政府真要下决心将国内车企数量压缩到十家“以内”，它有把握逃过被国企兼并的命运吗？ 当前这场经济危机绝不是一场周期性衰退，而是由债务泡沫引发的结构性经济衰退，若想成功应对这场世纪性经济大危机，必须像共产党常说的“要调动一切积极因素”才行，如果总是瞻前顾后，时时还想“留一手”，那只能是自毁长城。应该像邓小平上世纪60年代在“三年困难时期”所说的那样，哪种解决经济问题的形式有效就应该采取哪种形式，“不合法”的使它合法起来。最近社会上对中国政府调控经济的能力有些质疑，然而说实话，面对当前这场非典型性经济危机，各国政府在应对方面都是摸着石头过河，迄今谁也没能拿出成功的办法，胜算最大的做法只能是让各种经济成分“八仙过海，各显其能”。 当大家都是“瞎猫”的时候，走群众路线最有可能碰上“死耗子”/p>

CHINA'S GREAT DEPRESSION

  Having recently completed Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, I couldn’t help draw the parallels between America’s roaring 20’s and China’s roaring economy today, and I couldn’t help conclude that China will inevitably fall in a depression just like America did during the 1930s. The ive of this article is to present an Austrian argument as to why this must happen; to substantiate my arguments, I will be quoting Rothbard’s Fifth Edition where relevant.

  Before proceeding any further, I would urge all readers who haven’t read Rothbard’s “America’s Great Depression”, to pick up a copy and read it. First, it is a real pleasant read, and Rothbard’s witty style of writing makes reading it fun. Second, the first part of the book develops the Austrian Business Cycle Theory, which is indispensable for understanding credit booms and their inevitable busts. Finally, the second part of the book elaborates the development and the causes of the Inflationary Boom of the 1920s and provides a basis for comparison with the economic policies of modern-day China.

  In order to establish our parallel, we need some historical perspective of the relationship between a world superpower and a rising economic giant. In the 1920s, Great Britain was the superpower of the world, and the United States was the rising giant. As such, Great Britain ran its economic policies independently, and the U.S. adapted its own policies in a somewhat subordinated manner. Today, The United States is the hegemonic superpower of the world, and China is the rising economic giant. Not surprisingly, the U.S. runs its policy independently, while China adjusts its own accordingly.

Continuing our parallel analysis, during the 1920s the British Empire was already in decline, was militarily overextended, and in order to pay for its imperial adventures, resorted to debasing its own currency and running continuous foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, Britain was savings-short, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world was financing her. Meanwhile, America was running trade surpluses and was a net creditor nation. Importantly from a historical point of view, the British Empire collapsed when the rest of the world pulled the plug on their credit and began capital repatriation. Today, the American Empire is in decline, is militarily overextended, and is financing her overextended empire with the “tried-and-true” methods of currency debasement and never-ending foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, America is savings-starved, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world is financing her. At the same time, today China runs trade surpluses and is a net-creditor nation. When the rest of the world finally pulls the plug on American credit, will the American Empire also collapse?

The cause of the Depression, as Rothbard explains, was a credit expansion that fuelled the boom. According to Rothbard, “[o]ver the entire period of the boom, we find that the money supply increased by $28.0 billion, a 61.8 percent increase over the eight year period [of 1921-1929]. This was an average annual increase of 7.7 percent, a very sible degree of inflation (p.93)…The entire monetary expansion took place in money substitutes, which are products of credit creation… The prime factor in generating the inflation of the 1920s was the increase in total bank reserves” (p.102). In other words, during the 1920s, the United States experienced an inflationary credit boom. This was most evident in the booming stock and the booming real estate markets. Furthermore, there was a “spectacular boom in foreign bonds… It was a direct reflection of American credit expansion, and particularly of the low interest rates generated by that expansion” (p.130). To stem the boom, the Fed attempted in vain to use moral suasion on the markets and restrain credit expansion only for “legitimate business. Importantly, consumer “prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period” (p. 86). No doubt the stable consumer prices contributed to the overall sense of economic stability, and the majority of professional economists then did not realize that the economy was not fundamentally sound. To them the bust came as a surprise.

Today, in a similar fashion, the seeds of Depression are sown in China.  Economists hail the growth of China, many not realizing that China is undergoing an inflationary credit boom that dwarfs that American one during the roaring ‘20s. According to official government statistics, 2002 Chinese GDP growth was 8%, and 2003 growth was 8.5%, and some analysts believe these numbers to be conservative. According to the People’s Bank of China own web site (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/baogaoyutongjishuju/), “Money & Quasi Money Supply” for 2001/01 was 11.89 trillion, for 2002/01 was 15.96 trillion, for 2003/01 was 19.05 trillion, and for 2004/01 was 22.51 trillion yuan. In other words, money supply for 2001, 2002, and 2003 grew respectively 34.2%, 19.3%, and 18.1%. Thus, during the last three years, money supply in China grew approximately three times faster than money supply in the U.S. during the 1920s.

No wonder the Chinese stock market has been booming and the Chinese real estate market is on fire. Just like the U.S. in the 20s, China finances today foreign countries, mostly the U.S., by buying U.S. government bonds with their trade surplus dollars. Just like the Fed’s failed attempts of moral suasion during the 20s, the Chinese government today similarly attempts in vain to curtail growth of credit by providing it only to those industries that need it, that is, only to industries that the government endorses for usually political reasons. Also, for most of the current boom, Chinese consumer prices have been mostly tame and even falling, while prices for raw commodities have been skyrocketing, which perfectly fits the Austrian view that prices of higher-order goods, such as raw materials, should rise relative to prices of lower-order goods, such as consumer goods. This indeed confirms that credit expansion has already been in progress for a considerable time, and that inflation now is in an advanced stage, although it has not yet reached a runaway mode. Thus, economic conditions in China today are strikingly similar to those in America during the 1920s, and the multi-year credit expansion implies that a bust is inevitable.

There are also important parallels regarding currency and export policy. During the 1920s, the British Pound was overvalued and was used by smaller countries as a reserve currency. While Britain ran its inflationary policies during the 1920’s, it was losing gold to other countries, mainly the United States. Therefore, “if the United States government were to inflate American money, Great Britain would no longer lose gold to the United States” (p. 143). Exacerbating the problem further, the Americans artificially stimulated foreign lending, which further strengthened American farm exports, aggravated the net-export problem, and accelerated the gold flow imbalances. “It [foreign lending] also established American trade, not on a solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on a feverish promotion of loans later revealed to be unsound” (p. 139). “[President] Hoover was so enthusiastic about subsidizing foreign loans that he commented later that even bad loans helped American exports and thus provided a cheap form of relief and employment—a cheap form that later brought expensive defaults and financial distress” (p.141) Thus, the preceding discussion makes it clear, that the fundamental reasons behind the American inflationary policy were (1) to check Great Britain’s drains of gold to the United States, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate agricultural exports.

Similarly, today the dollar is overvalued and used as the reserve currency of the world. The U.S. runs its inflationary policy and is losing dollars to the rest of the world, mainly China (and Japan). Today, the currency and export policy of China is anchored around its peg to the dollar. The main reason for this is that by artificially undervaluing its own currency, and therefore overvaluing the dollar, China artificially stimulates its manufacturing exports. The second reason is that by buying the excess U.S. dollars and reinvesting them in U.S. government bonds, it acts as a foreign lender to the United States. The third reason is that this foreign lending stimulates American demand for Chinese manufacturing exports and allows the Chinese government to relieve its current unemployment problems. In other words, the motives behind the Chinese currency and export policy today are identical to the American ones during the 1920s: (1) to support the overvalued U.S. dollar, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate its manufacturing exports. Just like America in the 1920s, China establishes its trade today not on the solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on the basis of foreign loans. No doubt, most of these loans will turn out to be very expensive because they will be repaid with greatly depreciated dollars, which in turn will exacerbate down the road the growing financial distress of the banking sector in China.

Therefore, it is clear that China travels today the road to Depression. How severe this depression will be, will critically depend on two developments. First, how much longer the Chinese government will pursue the inflationary policy, and second how doggedly it will fight the bust. The longer it expands and the more its fights the bust, the more likely it is that the Chinese Depression will turn into a Great Depression. Also, it is important to realize that just like America’s Great Depression in the 1930s triggered a worldwide Depression, similarly a Chinese Depression will trigger a bust in the U.S., and therefore a recession in the rest of the world.

Unless there is an unforeseen banking, currency, or a derivative crisis spreading throughout the world, it is my belief that the Chinese bust will occur sometime in 2008-2009, since the Chinese government will surely pursue expansionary policies until the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in China. By then, inflation will be most likely out of control, probably already in runaway mode, and the government will have no choice but to slam the brakes and induce contraction. In 1929 the expansion stopped in July, the stock market broke in October, and the economy collapsed in early 1930. Thus, providing for a latency period of approximately half a year between credit contraction and economic collapse, based on my Olympic Games timing, I would pinpoint the bust for 2009. Admittedly, this is a pure speculation on my part; naturally, the bust could occur sooner or later.

While I base my timing of bust on the 2008 Olympic Games, Marc Faber, the foremost Austrian authority in the world on Chinese economic development, believes that the bust will occur sooner. According to him, the U.S. is due for a meaningful recession relatively soon, which in turn will exacerbate already existing manufacturing overcapacities in China. This, coupled with growing credit problems, makes him believe that China will tip into recession sooner than the Olympic Games. In other words, Dr. Faber believes that a U.S. recession will trigger the Depression in China. Indeed, that very well may be the trigger, but if so, it still remains to be seen whether the Chinese government will let the bust run its course or choose the route of a “crack-up” boom, come hell or high water.

We should also consider another possible trigger for a bust, namely trade surpluses turning into trade deficits due to the accelerated rise of prices for resources, such as commodities, which China must import. Faced with trade deficits, China may decide to dishoard surpluses by selling U.S. government bonds, or it may decide to abandon its peg to the dollar. In either case, this will exacerbate the problems of the ailing U.S. economy, which in turn will boomerang back to China.

Finally, the bust may be triggered by a worldwide crisis in crude oil supplies. Peak oil supply is around the corner, if not already behind us, and Middle East or Caspian instability could sharply cut oil supplies. Historically, oil shortages and their concomitant rise of oil prices have always induced a recession. China’s growing dependence on oil ensures that should an oil crisis occur, it will slip into recession.

To summarize, the likely candidates for a trigger to the Chinese depression are (1) a worldwide currency, banking, or derivatives crisis, (2) a U.S. recession, (3) the containment of runaway inflation, (4) the disappearance of Chinese trade surpluses, and (5) an oil supply crisis.

Whatever the trigger of the bust in China, there is little doubt that this will provide the onset of a worldwide depression. Just like the U.S. emerged from the Great Depression as the unrivalled superpower of the world, so it is likely that China will emerge as the next

　　最近阅完Rothbard 的作品《美国经济危机》（America’s Great Depression）我不禁要画下美国20世纪经济轨迹和今天中国的经济发展方向，而我也不禁要做下这样的结论，那就是中国将不可避免的堕入类似于美国在1930年代所陷入的经济危机之中。我写下这一文章的目的便是要从理论“奥地利范式”的角度告诉大家这一切为何会发生，为了证实我的观点，我会在需要的时候引述Rothbard作品第五版的内容。

　　在正式开始之前，我想提醒任何没有阅读过Rothbard的《美国经济危机》的读者们，请找来一本并将其阅完。首先，那的确是一项让人振奋的阅读经历，Rothbard诙谐的写作方式让整部作品显得意趣横生；其次，这本书的第一部分向读者们展示的“奥地利范式”（奥地利商业经济周期理论；Austrian Business Cycle Theory）是了解信用扩张以及其不可避免的走向大萧条内在因素不可或缺的理论基础；最后，这本书的第二部分向读者们详述了20年代通货膨胀性繁荣的轨迹及其成因，并为现代中国与当时美国的经济政策对比打下了坚实的基础。

　　为了使我们的比较得到更好的理解，我们必须回顾一下世界霸主与新兴的经济巨人之间的联系，在二十年代，不列颠是世界霸主，而美国是新兴巨人，因此，不列颠独立的运行着它自己的经济政策，而美国的经济政策的运行则适时地以某种从属地位出现。现如今，美国成为了世界上的超级霸主，而中国成为了新兴的经济巨人，毫无疑义的，美国独立运行着其经济政策，而中国则相应的调整着它自己的。

　　继续我们的比较分析，整个二十年代大英帝国都处于不断的衰落之中，由于军事上的过分扩张，为了填补其冒险行为，堂堂大英帝国不得不诉诸于持续贬值的货币和连绵不断的国际贸易及预算赤字。换句话说，不列颠是一个储蓄不足、不折不扣地债务国。而世界上的其他国家则不断地为其融资。与此同时，美国运营者持续不断的顺差贸易，还是一个毫不掺假的债权国。从历史的角度来看，最最值得注意的是，一旦其他的国家拔起贷款的塞子并开始回笼资金，那么这艘不列颠巨轮便将搁浅。现如今，美利坚帝国同样走上了衰落之路，军事上同样过分扩张，并通过货币贬值和永无止境的国际贸易和预算赤字这一早已通过实践检验过了的方法供养起其早已过度扩张了的帝国。换言之，美国成为了一个储蓄不足、不折不扣地债务国，而世界上剩下的国家正为其提供财务支持。与此同时，现如今的中国同样拥有稳定的贸易顺差、是一个如假包换的债权国。而一旦世界上的其他国家再次拔起它那贷款的塞子，那么这艘名为美利坚帝国的巨轮会不会再次搁浅呢？

　　经济大萧条的起因，用Rothbard的话来讲，是由信用扩张所致的急速发展所导致的。根据Rothbard所言，“纵观整个繁荣时期，我们发现货币供应增加至280亿美元，在整个八年期间（1921-1929年）增加了61.8%，相当于每年增加7.7%，这是一个相当可观的增幅（P.93）……整个货币扩张以货币代替品的形式出现，而这也正是信用创造的产物……而在整个二十年代期间通货膨胀产生的首要因素便是银行准备金总额的上涨（P.102）”。（“[o]ver the entire period of the boom, we find that the money supply increased by $28.0 billion, a 61.8 percent increase over the eight year period [of 1921-1929]. This was an average annual increase of 7.7 percent, a very sible degree of inflation (p.93)…The entire monetary expansion took place in money substitutes, which are products of credit creation… The prime factor in generating the inflation of the 1920s was the increase in total bank reserves” (p.102).）换言之，整个二十世纪二十年代期间，美国经历了一次具有通货膨胀倾向的信贷扩张，这在兴旺的股票市场和兴盛的不动产市场上表现得最为明显。更何况，出现了“外国债券市场上令人叹为观止的繁荣景象……这直接反映了美国的信用扩张速度，特别是由这一扩张而产生的低利率。(P.130)”（“spectacular boom in foreign bonds… It was a direct reflection of American credit expansion, and particularly of the low interest rates generated by that expansion”）。为了阻止信用扩张的不断发酵，美联储妄图通过道德劝诫来说服市场，并试图将信贷扩张管束于“正当生意”（legitimate business）之中。而值得注意的是，“这一期间的消费品价格水平基本稳定，甚至会在某些时候稍稍下降（P.86）”（consumer “prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period” (p. 86).）。无疑，消费者价格水平的稳定与否有助于人们在大体上了解一个国家的经济运行是否健康，而当时主流的职业经济学家因而并没有听出国家经济运行中的不和谐之音。在他们中的大多数人看来经济运行的不景气来得太叫人措手不及了。

　　现今，追随着类似的风尚，中国种下了大萧条的种子。经济学家们为中国经济的增长而欢欣雀跃，而他们中的许多人却并没有意识到中国正遭受着类似于二十世纪二十年代的那场严重削弱美国实力的大风暴那样的通货膨胀性信贷扩张。通过方的统计数据报告可知，中国2002年的GDP增长速度是8%，而2003年的则是8.5%，而某些分析家则认为这一数据过于保守，通过中国人民银行自己的网站，在“货币及准货币供应”（Money & Quasi Money Supply）这一栏里，2001年1月的数量是11.89万亿元，2002年1月增长至是15.96万亿元，到了2003年1月这一数量变为是19.05万亿元，而到了2004年1月这一数量停在了22.51万亿元，换句话说，2001年、2002年、2003年的货币供应的增长幅度分别为34.2%、19.3%和18.1%，因而，在过去的这三年间中国的货币供应增长幅度几乎为二十世纪二十年代美国的三倍。

　　怪不得中国的股票市场欣欣向荣，而中国的不动产市场则发展得如火如荼。正如二十年代的美国，中国现在不断地在为外国，主要是美国融资，不断用其在贸易顺差中所获得的真金白银的买入美国国债。也正如二十年代的美联储在用道德劝诫说服市场上的失败一样，中国也妄图通过只为需要的企业提供贷款来抑制信贷市场的发展，也就是说，只给那些由于某些众所周知的政治原因而得到支持的企业提供贷款。此外，在现今经济急速发展的大多数时候，中国的消费品价格水平都十分温顺和平，甚至略有下降，虽然与此同时中国的原材料价格曾一度飞涨，这一点是完美的契合了“奥地利范式”中所述的规律：高需求产品，诸如原材料，相对于低需求产品，诸如消费品，其价格上涨速度相对较快。这一点切切实实地证明信贷扩张已经在中国国内出现并发展了相当长的一段时间了，并且就在此时其通货膨胀也已经发展到了一个相当高级的水平，虽然此时的中国经济还没有踩上失控的红线。因此，此时中国的经济条件与二十年代的美国的相似性是显而易见的，多年来积累下来的信贷扩张程度也暗示着一场经济大萧条的出现终究也是难免的了。

　　两国之间在货币及出口政策上的可比性同样重要。就在整个二十年代，英镑价值被高估，因而成为了一些小国的储备货币。正当不列颠在整个二十年代期间实施通货膨胀性政策时，其货币所含的黄金价值在对比其他国家的货币，主要是在对比美国货币时不断下降。因此，“如果美元与此同时使其货币保持通胀，那么大不列颠货币所含的黄金价值便不再下降。（P.143）”（“if the United States government were to inflate American money, Great Britain would no longer lose gold to the United States” (p. 143).）然而更加恶化这一问题的是，美国竟故意刺激国外贷款水平，这一举动可以进一步加强美国农产品的出口额。这一行为是的净出口问题变得尖锐起来，并直接造成了黄金流动的不平衡。“它（国外贷款）同样也确立美国贸易的基础，但这一基础因其并不是确立在一个互惠而富有生产价值的交换关系上，而是确立在对之后的被证实是毫无价值的贷款的狂热刺激之上而显得并不那么可靠。（P.139）”“[总统]胡佛如此热心于给予外国贷款以补贴，以至于他之后表示说就算是不良贷款也有助于美国出口，因而这是用于减缓经济压力和刺激就业的代价低廉的手段——这种代价低廉的手段之后是美国获得了昂贵的拖欠帐款和金融困顿。(P.141)。”（“It [foreign lending] also established American trade, not on a solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on a feverish promotion of loans later revealed to be unsound” (p. 139). “[President] Hoover was so enthusiastic about subsidizing foreign loans that he commented later that even bad loans helped American exports and thus provided a cheap form of relief and employment—a cheap form that later brought expensive defaults and financial distress” (p.141)）因而，之前的论述使得一切变得明朗起来，美国的通胀政策之后的根本缺陷在于：（1）紧跟不列颠对美国的黄金价值流向；（2）刺激国外贷款，并且（3）刺激农产品出口。

　　同样的，美元价值一样被高估，并被作为储备货币用于这个世界上的每个角落。其美元价值在对比世界各国特别是中国（和日本）货币时不断下降。现今，中国的货币和出口政策正围绕着美元打转。其主要原因是要故意低估它自己的货币，并因此而高估美元。这样就可以人为的刺激他自己的制造业出口。而另外一个原因是这样可以用来购买更多美元已用于购买美国债券，中国便成为了美国的外国贷款人。而最后一个原因是这一外国贷款可以刺激美国对中国制造业出口的需求量并允许中国解决其失业问题。换言之，今天中国的货币与出口政策与二十年代的美国政策并无二致：（1）支持并巩固被高估的美元价值；（2）刺激国外贷款；（3）刺激制造业出口。正如二十年代的美国一样，中国并没有将其贸易建立在互惠和具有生产价值的交换这一坚实基础之上，而是建立于外国贷款的基础之上。无疑，这些贷款中的大多数的代价都是十分昂贵的，那是由于它们将会与急剧贬值的美元一起需要人偿还，这样反过来会驱使中国的银行部门在急驰的金融困顿之路上渐行渐远。

　　因此，中国正旅行于大萧条之路上这一点是显而易见的。而这一场大萧条到底有多严重，这主要依靠于两方面的发展。首先，中国还要在追逐通货膨胀性政策这条路上走多远，其次便是它在对抗大萧条时到底能够便显出多大的顽强性。其扩张的时间越长、与经济危机所作的对抗越多，中国的经济大萧条就越有可能演化成为世界性的危机。此外，意识到正如二十世纪三十年代的美国经济大萧条处罚全球经济不景气那样，中国经济大萧条也会触发美国的经济大萧条，之后便会传染至世界上的其他国家亦是十分重要的。

　　除非出现无法预料到的银行、货币或者是衍生物危机散布于世界各地，我相信中国的经济萧条会在2008-2009年期间的某个时候爆发。因为可以十分肯定的是，中国一定会在2008年夏季运会之前一直追逐通货膨胀性的经济政策。到那时，通货膨胀很有可能会失去控制，或者已经失去了控制。而则很有可能不得不猛拉刹车并迅速收缩。美国当时的信用扩张政策停止于当年七月份，股市崩溃于十月份，而整个经济则是在1930年的年初轰然倒塌。因此，推测可知信用紧缩政策与经济崩溃之间的潜伏期大约是半年，结合我的奥林匹克运动会时间表，我认为经济崩溃的精确时间大约是在2009年。很显然，这纯粹只是我个人的推测；而不可避免的是，这场经济萧条早晚会发生。

　　在我以2008年夏季奥运会作为经济萧条的时间基点的时候，Marc Faber，这奥地利最负盛名的中国经济发展专家，相信经济危机将会在更短的时间之内。通过他的解释，可以得知美国将最近将会遭受一场影响深远的经济衰退，这样反过来会加重中国现有的制造业生产能力过剩的问题，这一点，加之不断增长的信贷危机，使他相信中国会在运动会之前就一头钻进经济不景气的浪潮之中。换言之，Faber博士相信，一场即将到来美国经济衰退将会触发中国经济大萧条的引爆点。确实，那很有可能就是经济不景气的触发点，但是即便如此，我们人需要观察中国是会让经济大萧条逃出它的手掌心，还是背水一战，选择一条“粉身碎骨”的繁荣之路。

　　而我们还需要触发经济大萧条的另一点因素，被称为由于资源，比如说日用品，这是中国进口的最多的产品之一，由于其价格上涨而应起的贸易顺差装化为贸易逆差。面对着贸易赤字，中国很有可能会选择通过抛售美国债权的方式来抛售公债，或者会决定放弃其紧盯美元的政策。不论是哪种情况，都会加重病息奄奄的美国现有的经济问题，而反过来对于中国而言，这都将成为自食其果的行为。

　　最后，经济不景气很有可能会以一场以原油供应问题而引发的全球性经济危机触发。若其没有在我们之后到达这一点，那么在今后的某一时刻达到顶峰的原油供应将到达拐点，而中东及里海地区的不安定因素将会在很大程度上减少原油的供应量。从历史的角度上来看，原油短缺总会引出一场经济衰退，中国经济的发展总是寄托于充足的石油保障，若是石油危机到来，那么它很快就会划入经济衰退的深渊。

　　最后作一个总结，最有可能引发中国经济大萧条的候选因素有：（1）世界性的货币、银行或者是信用衍生物危机；（2）美国经济衰退；（3）对时空的通货膨胀的控制度；（4）中国贸易顺差的消失；（5）原油供应危机。

　　而不论触发中国经济危机的是什么，有一点是可以肯定的，那就是这将是世界性经济大萧条的开端，正如美国在大萧条之后成为全世界无可匹敌的超级霸主一般，中国很有可能会在下一次经济危机之后坐上这把交椅。

请问基金公司，你们到底要干什么？？？

  看看这几天中国股市的表现，真是令人愤慨、无奈。明明中国的经济基本面是好的，经济危机发生在美国，可我们的股市却比美国跌的更多、更惨。股市里那些号称国家队的基金公司，不顾中国经济基本面是好的这一事实，今天这个不确定，明天那个不乐观，总是把现在的中国经济说得一无是处，天天看着美国股市的脸色操纵着中国的大盘，他们大涨我们不涨，他们小跌我们大跌，东施效颦，学都学不像！
   短短的一年时间，中国A股从6124点颠峰直线跌落至1665点的深渊之中，累计跌幅度惊人高达72.8%，居世界之首。在本轮史无前例的大暴跌中，中国的机构投资者尤其是基金公司扮演了及不光彩的角色。A股市值蒸发最多的时候达到了18万亿元之巨，基金公司难辞其咎，其自身也跌回2万亿元时代，基本回到了大牛市之前的起点，广大基民遭受到巨大的经济损失。
　　回顾过去的一年，基金公司见风使舵、呼风唤雨、指鹿为马、草木皆兵、望风而逃、抱团取暖、杀鸡取蛋、东挪西腾、走马换帅等一系列拙劣的表现，尽收广大基民的眼底。A股中的重权股、绩优基金重仓股都被基金经理们砸得面目全非，全都变成了人人避之不及的垃圾股！根据最权威的统计数据显示，2007年第三季度，市场所有股票型基金的仓位超过了80%以上，达到了历史峰值，并与上证综指的攀升情况保持了高度的一致性。换句话来说，去年从4000点奔牛至6000点，均是基金相互“抬轿”的结果，基金制造了蓝筹泡沫与股市空前繁荣的同时，也将数千万广大基民推向风险的悬崖边。
　　如果不是保险资金提前“反水”和大小非打破了市场筹码平衡，疯狂的基金们把沪指推上8000点或10000万点，肯定游刃有余。而日前破1800点“政策底”时，我们的基金经理反又觉着大盘点位高了，市场还没有跌够，反手做空，不计成本的疯狂抛售筹码，恶意进行打压。高位时助涨，低位时助跌，全然不顾广大基民的巨额损失！请问基金公司，你们这种令人难以理解的投资行为到底要干什么？
　　如今大部分基金公司违背自己的价值投资理念，形同恶庄，追涨杀跌。比如去年《中国船舶》被基金经理们推上上300元关口，还说投资价值合理，今天《中国船舶》被他们砸到30元反口又说价值高估。不成熟的中国基金群体如此作为，不仅没有起到平抑经济波动的作用，反而扭曲了整个社会对资本产品价格的估值标准，增加了对宏观经济运行的骚扰。更令人心寒的是大多数基金经理一直缺乏自己的判断，鹦鹉学舌紧跟在外资金融机构和外资投行的背后，邯郸学步。一个缺少经验与智慧、拿基民的钱如同儿戏般的基金公司，叫广大投资者怎么放心？
　　大多数基民都是拿着一生积攒起来的血汗钱，更有一些是拿着养老、下岗买断的钱来买基金的，买的是美好和希望！可一年多来这些基金公司的“理财专家”们给基民带来了些什么？从某种意义上来讲，是广大基民养活了你们，他们是你们的衣食父母，你们这样做，对得起广大的基民么？基金经理们，求求你们了，别再恶意的砸盘了，你们恶意砸盘停止之时，就是大盘向好之日！！！

本文从股友网转载，视角独特，DICK收藏请见谅。

引用

w-inds.的一首很立志的歌

(

                Trial
何度(なんど)だって起(お)き上(あ)がるよ

好几次跌倒了又怕起来

倒(たお)れても痛(いた)くても

即使跌倒即使会痛
no more tears最後流(さいごなが)す涙(なみだ)は

不再哭,这是最后的一滴泪
悔(くや)しい時(とき)じゃない嬉(うれ)しい時(とき)
没有遗憾的时候,只有快乐的时候
夢(ゆめ)を追(お)う事(こと)は時折現実(ときおりげんじつ)さと真逆(まことぎゃく)

在追求梦想往往与现实有着天壤之别的区别
才能なんて不确(ふかく)かで

才能什么的不可相信
すぐに立証(りっしょう)できない
因为它不能立刻呈现出来
谁も傷付(きずつ)けずに街(まち)をきたわけじゃない

没有谁不带着伤,却不是因为来到城市的缘故
でも决(き)めてた保障(ほしょう)などない

即使没有确切的人生保障
明日(あした)にかけてゆくと
向着明天飞奔
走(はし)りだした夢(ゆめ)へと

一旦开始向梦想跑起来
ただ僕(ぼく)だけの為(ため)じゃない

为了自己什么也不顾
現実(げんじつ)は思(おも)うよりあまくはなく辛(つら)いけど

现实要比想象更没快乐,艰辛得多
今日(きょう)の僕(ぼく)は昨日(きのう)よりも少しだけ強(つよ)いはず

今天的我比起昨天的我只多了点坚强

no more tears強(つよ)がりはいつだって

因此不要流泪,逞强着
僕(ぼく)の背中(せなか)そっと後押(あとお)しする
从我背后渐渐涌出